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Mineral Rights As They Affect The
Community Property System*
HARRIET S. DAGGETT**
The new problems concerning mineral rights specifically af-
fect the rules of community property in Louisiana in two major
categories: (1) the conflicting claims of ownership between the
community and the separate estates of husband and wife; (2) the
conflicting rights of usufructuary and naked owner. When the
latter situation arises upon the dissolution of the community by
death of one of the spouses, it raises not only the problems of com-
munity property settlements but the many mooted questions of
the whole law of usufruct and hence must occupy the greater
portion of this paper. Before focusing upon the specific problems
of the two main divisions, it seems advisable to point out the fun-
damental issue necessarily underlying the settlement of these par-
ticular questions.
Whether or not the disposition of the right to explore for oil
and gas should be considered in every case as an alienation of a
part of the realty has not been definitely established as yet. The
legal nature of the right to capture minerals was the critical
ground of legal battle in Louisiana for many years. It may be said
definitively that Louisiana has adopted the non-ownership theory
of oil and gas which means that only a right to explore may be con-
ferred.' This right may arise out of a contract of sale or a contract
of lease. It is settled that the former creates but a servitude and it
is the opinion of the author that a lease, which likewise gives only
the right to explore, can logically confer no greater substantive
right when problems affecting the theory of ownership are in-
volved. 2 Within this limit, however, the problem has been re-
solved into the two major compartments of servitude and lease,
with fairly certain application of the law of those subdivisions.
This material will appear as a chapter in the monograph, Mineral
Rights in Louisiana, to be published by the Louisiana State University Press
at an early date.
*0 Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
2. This problem is fully discussed in the chapter on the Nature of the
R4ght in the monograph, Mineral Rights in Louisiana, referred to above.
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The legal nature and ownership of the product derived from the
exercise of the rights of servitude and lease is as yet only partly
defined and presents as important problems as did the original
question of the nature of the ownership, and the present problems
of servitude and lease. There seems to be but one answer, in the
judgment of the writer. No one would dispute the fact that oil
and gas are a part of the realty while in storage within the earth.
Their severance should be considered as a disposal of a part of
the land regardless of the legal transaction involved. Some of the
questions issuing out of this major problem have been settled by
the courts and will be referred to first as a basis for the discussion
of the topic of this paper.
When a possessor, whether in good or bad faith, restores land
to the owner he must also return the oil and gas or its price be-
cause oil is not a fruit. The landmark decision of Elder v. Ellerbe
laid down the principle in 1914 and relied heavily upon the French
authorities to reach this eminently correct conclusion. The court
referred in particular to the famous statement from Baudry-La-
cantinerie that "fruits must be of things that are born and reborn
of the soil" which cannot be simplified nor improved upon to ex-
press this concept. Since oil and gas deposits have taken years
which geologists can only estimate to form, they represent the
very antithesis of the idea of fruits of the land which the posses-
sor in good faith may keep.'
The case of Federal Land Bank v. Mulhern5 expresses the
same basic thought though the question was raised in a very dif-
ferent manner. In this case production of oil under a lease granted
after the giving of a mortgage was held to be such waste of the
land and depreciation of the security as to give the mortgagee the
right to foreclose his mortgage immediately.
The court in Wiley v. Davis spoke of the leasing of a minor's
land under the special enabling act as an alienation of his realty
and insisted upon a court order safeguarding such a disposal. The
federal and state income tax provisions logically allow deductions
for depletion in certain cases.7 The whole tenor of the Louisiana
3. 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
4. The same problem was presented and Elder v. Eflerbe followed in Jack-
son v. Shaw, 151 La. 796, 92 So. 339 (1922).
5. 180 La. 627, 157 So. 370 (1934).
6. 164 La. 1090, 115 So. 280 (1928); See also Andrus v. Tidewater Oil Co.,
189 La. 142, 179 So. 61 (1938).
7. Revenue Act of 1938, § 23(m), 52 Stat. 460, -, 26 U.S.C.A. § 23(m)
(1938); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 299, 53 S.Ct. 161, 77 L.Ed. 318 (1932);
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severance tax provisions, including their name, carries the thought
of a loss of a natural resource which living states will not remain
to see replaced. The fact that oil is not a fruit which will come
again with normal culture but is a part of the land which is dis-
sipated forever is a self evident truth.
The argument used against this simple notion that oil and gas
are parts of the land consists chiefly in the court's use of the anal-
ogy of "products," synonymous with "fruits" in the French and
Louisiana codes,8 in reaching the conclusion that royalty is rent
in a mineral lease. There are several types of royalty which are
not rent. The word is sometimes used loosely to indicate an in-
terest in the mineral right,10 or as synonymous with servitude.
The word has been used to mean the consideration paid for a min-
eral right or servitude or for a lease.," The word is used fre-
quently in a common form, termed a Royalty Deed, wherein it
describes a mineral interest over which the owner-sometimes
vendor, sometimes vendee-may have no leasing or production
privilege. 2 In a case soon to be argued before the Supreme Court,
the contention is made that a reservation of "royalty" was under-
stood to be a "rent charge," not a servitude and hence not subject
to the prescription of ten years' non user. "Custom" was urged
upon the district court to explain this meaning.'3 Confusion aris-
Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 S.Ct. 225, 77 L.Ed. 489 (1932); La. Act 21 of
1934 as amended by Acts 2 of 1934 (E.S.), 7 of 1934 (2 E.S.), 21 of 1935 (E.S.),
11 of 1935 (3 E.S.), 24 and 143 of 1936, 229 and 231 of 1938.
8. See Arts. 3453 and 2671, La. Civil Code of 1870 (fruits); Art. 502, (prod-
ucts); Art. 545, French Civil Code (corresponding to Art. 502, La. Civil Code
of 1870, (fruits).
9. Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925); Board of
Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So.
373 (1928).
10. Glassmire, Oil and Gas Leases and Royalties (1935) 64: "Mineral
grants are often erroneously called 'royalty deeds' but that designation
Is a misnomer; for it confuses the royalty proper with that which produces
the royalty, or rather it mistakes the proceeds of the thing for the thing it-
self. Therefore a grant of minerals does not necessarily presuppose a lease to
develop; but as a matter of fact, a lease is necessary in order that the royalty
may be obtained. In other words, it is not the practice actually to operate for
oil and gas under a general warranty or mineral deed."
See Barksdale, The Code from the Standpoint of the Royalty Owners
(1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 598.
11. Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 165 La. 907, 116 So. 379 (1928); Wilkins v. Nelson,
155 La. 807, 99 So. 607 (1924); Waller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
40 F. (2d) 892 (C.C.A. 5th, 1930); Herold v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
42 F. (2d) 942 (C.C.A. 5th, 1930); Lucas v. Baucum, 50 F. (2d) 806 (C.C.A. 5th,
1931).
12. See Royalty Deed forms; Mount Forest Fur Farms of America v.
Cockrell, 179 La. 795, 156 So. 228 (1934); Wall v. United Gas Public Service,
181 So. 562 (La. App. 1938). See also note 10 supra.
13. Vincent v. Bullock, Sup. Ct. of La. Docket No. 35,088 (1938). (On ap-
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ing from the varied connotations of the word has already been a
fruitful ground for attempted fraud.14
The word "royalty" is used most frequently perhaps, and cer-
tainly most properly as far as its derivation 5 is concerned, to de-
scribe the portion of the working interest which must be paid
to the lessor, whether he is owner of the land or of the servitude
or is merely a lessee himself, for the privilege of developing the
lease. This use of the word was common in Louisiana instruments
and cases before it became necessary for the courts to specifically
label it rent, in order to apply the appropriate provisions of the
civil code in that connection. 8
Necessity for this label arose in connection with a contract to
produce a solid, gravel. The grantor of the privilege under a con-
tract which was found to be a lease claimed a lessor's privilege
and it was granted. The court stated "that land adapted to mining
or quarrying may be leased for a certain portion of the produce
of such mine or quarry, and the fact that said portion is called
'royalty,' instead of rent, is not of the least consequence.'" The
use of royalty as a synonym for rent for purposes of convenience
in applying the lessor's privilege, the prescriptive period for rent
collections,8 or for any other reason, does not affect the mineral
substance in its relation to the land or prevent its being a sever-
ance of the realty.
COMMUNITY versus SEPARATE PROPERTY
Conflicting Claims of Ownership
The same fundamental questions of ownership of oil and gas
arise in settlements between husband and wife or their heirs upon
dissolution of the community and in the determination of credit-
ors' rights during the existence of the community, as are sug-
peal from a judgment for defendants in the Sixteenth Judicial District Court
in and for the Parish of Iberia, Louisiana; James D. Simon, Judge.)
14. Chatman v. Giddens, 150 La. 594, 91 So. 56 (1922). See also Fontenot v.
Ludeau, Sup. Ct. of La., Docket Nos. 34872-3-4-5-6-7 (Consolidated for Argu-
ment). (Appealed from the Thirteenth Judicial District Court in and for the
Parish of Evangeline, Louisiana; J. Cleveland Fruge, Judge.)
15. See Glassmire, op. cit. supra note 10, at 55 et seq.
16. Martel v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 114 La. 351, 38 So. 253
(1905); Houssiere Latreille Oil Co. v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 115 La.
107, 38 So. 32 (1905); Goodson v. Vivian Oil Co., 129 La. 955, 57 So. 281 (1912);
Hudspeth v. Producers' Oil Co., 134 La. 1013, 54 So. 891 (1914); Baird v. Atlas
Oil Co., 146 La. 1091, 84 So. 366 (1920); Rowe v. Atlas Oil Co., 147 La. 37, 84 So.
485 (1920); Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924).
17. Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 110, 103 So. 526, 527 (1925).
18. Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167
La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1928).
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gested by the problems of the respective rights of usufructuary
and naked owner. The three estates involved in such settlements,
namely, the separate property of the husband, the separate prop-
erty of the wife, and the community property, make the problem
even more involved in some of its aspects.
Separate Property of Husband: The separate property of the
husband, while not presenting any trouble as far as creditors'
rights are concerned because it is available for the satisfaction of
the personal debts of the husband and the obligations of the com-
munity, raises the question of ownership of oil and gas, of lease
rentals, and of bonuses upon settlement at the dissolution of the
community. The fruits, both civil and natural, of the husband's
separate property fall into the community during its existence. 9
If the test of Elder v. Ellerbe2 0 that "oil is not a fruit" is applied,
obviously the wife or her heirs have no claims upon the minerals
produced. If the test of Logan v. State Gravel Company" and
Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Com-
pany12 that "royalty is rent" is taken to mean rent in the usual
predial lease sense of the word, the income falls into the civil fruit
class and therefore into the community. If the husband sells his
mineral rights for a lump sum or for part cash plus "royalties" in
the nature of deferred payments it could scarcely be argued that
he had not disposed of an interest in his land, the proceeds of
which would, if properly preserved, continue to be his separate
property. If he leases, he alienates the same right to explore
which affects his estate substantially in the same manner.
Separate Property of the Wife: The fruits of the separate es-
tate of the wife under her own administration remain hers, secure
in general from all creditors except her own.' 3 If, however, the
husband is administering her property or if he and she are admin-
istering it "indifferently' '24 the fruits fall into the community and
are available for the satisfaction of the husband's creditors and
those of the community, and must be considered in the final set-
tlement of the community as well.
Few cases have as yet been decided in this jurisdiction which
bear specifically upon these problems. The case of Shell Petrol-
19. Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana (1931) 29.
20. 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
21. 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925).
22. 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1928).
23. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 19, chap. VI.
24. Art. 2386, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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eum Corporation v. Calcasieu Real Estate and Oil Co. 25 presented
a situation wherein a wife suing in her own right and administ-
ering her own separate property recovered royalty due her as a
joint lessor with her husband who had leased community
property. Since the wife was administering her own separate
property, the question involving the community did not arise.
Eight states 6 of the Union have the community property sys-
tem but Louisiana is the only one of these which adheres to the
non-ownership theory" of oil and gas. California is in the "quali-
fied ownership" class.28 No great help, therefore, is to be expected
from these jurisdictions for the solution of Louisiana's community
property problems of oil and gas, though the decisions are valu-
able for their analogies.
The case of Lucas v. Baucum29 arose by petition for review of
the decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals for the dis-
trict of Louisiana. The latter had decided that money received by
Mrs. Baucum, as consideration in a sale of certain fractional roy-
alty interests due her under a lease of land belonging to her sep-
arate estate but administered by her husband, was community
property and hence should be taxed "one-half to her husband and
one-half to petitioner."80 In reversing this decision, Judge Hutche-
son regarded the sale of 3/32 from her original 1/8 royalty inter-
est as a sale of "her mineral rights in the land."2 1 Since there is so
little jurisprudence on the questions under discussion, a lengthy
quotation should be permitted:
"Respondent, conceding that the courts of Louisiana have
not directly determined the matter at issue here, insists that
the state of the law in Louisiana upon the character and qual-
ity of an oil interest in the light of the jurisprudence of Louisi-
ana upon community and separate property makes it clear that
both royalties received from oil wells and the proceeds of their
sale are fruits of the land, and fall into the community.
25. 185 La. 751, 170 So. 785 (1936).
26. Arizona, California, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington,
Louisiana.
27. Glassmire lists Indiana, New York, Kentucky, Louisiana and Okla-
homa as "non-ownership states," op. cit. supra note 10, at 104.
28. Id. at 100; Graciosa Oil Co. v. Santa Barbara Co., 155 Cal. 140, 99 Pac.
483 (1909); Western 0. & R. Co. v. Venago Oil Corp., 218 Cal. 733, 24 P. (2d)
971 (1933).
29. 50 F. (2d) 806 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931).
30. Bamma Baucum, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Re-
spondent, 17 B.T.A. 1312 (1929).
31. Lucas v. Baucum, 50 F. (2d) 806, 808 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931).
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"Assuming, but not deciding, that if the question here were
as to the status of royalties reserved in oil leases, that is, re-
turns to respondent as rents paid her for the right to take the
minerals from her land, or even as to the status of the proceeds
from the sale in bulk at an estimated figure of the royalties to
be received, that the law in Louisiana might be different from
that in Texas. It is perfectly clear, we think, that the facts pre-
sented here defeat respondent's claim. Here the respondent
owning as her separate property the lands and minerals, first
through the medium of a lease conveyed to the extent of 7/
the real incorporeal right to extract the minerals from the
land, Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526, 527;
Wilkins v. Nelson, 155 La. 807, 99 So. 607; Bodcaw Lbr. Co. v.
Cox, 159 La. 810, 106 So. 313, 314, reserving in herself, in sep-
arate and distinct ownership, 18 of the minerals in and under
the land (Bodcaw v. Cox, supra). Thereafter, she parted this
time, not by lease, but by sale having however the same effect,
(Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526) with 3/32
of her mineral rights, vesting the purchaser with the incor-
poreal right, the real right or servitude, not as she had thereto-
fore herself owned it, as a part of and appurtenant to the land,
but separate and distinct from the land. Wilkins v. Nelson, 155
La. 807, 99 So. 607. Thus, in effect, by two separate convey-
ances she sold to various purchasers, not an interest in royal-
ties, but 31/32 of her mineral rights in the land. Leydig v.
Comm. (C.C.A.) 43 F. (2d) 494; Bellport v. Harrison, 123 Kan.
310, 255 P. 52.
"Certainly it would not be contended by respondent that
if she had sold the land without reservation of the minerals
she had thereby converted her separate property into commu-
nity; nor had she sold her land reserving her minerals, or her
minerals reserving her land, would it be contended by her
that either of these transactions would have converted the
proceeds from separate to community. It cannot be any more
contended that because the minerals were disposed of by frac-
tional sales such a result would come about.
"Whatever then may be the law, which we do not at all
undertake to decide, as to the status, whether separate or com-
munity property, of royalties which respondent received from
her lease, or as to the status of the proceeds if respondent, in-
stead of selling her mineral interests had merely sold the right
to receive the royalties to accrue under the lease, we think it
19381
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perfectly plain that upon no reasonable theory can a sale, as
here, by the wife of a part of her mineral interests operate to
convert separate into community property, and that the rul-
ing of the board has the effect of a spoliation of the wife's
property in favor of the community, upon facts which do not
at all sustain it.'8 2
Undoubtedly, Judge Hutcheson arrived at the correct conclu-
sion. Unfortunately, under the process of reasoning and by delib-
erate reservation, the question of the nature of the royalty, had
the mineral interest remained in Mrs. Baucum's hands, was left
open. It is submitted that if that fact were taken as a ground for a
mystical conversion of the separate property into community
property, that the distinction attempted would be one without a
difference. The United States Board of Tax Appeals in 1931,88
considering the same community property question of separate
versus joint income tax return on royalty sales by the husband,
followed the decision of Lucas v. Baucum and added nothing to
the open question.
The subsequent case of Turbeville v. Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue84 (also on review of a decision of the United States
Board of Tax Appeals but from the District of Texas) set forth
the same question pertinent to income tax returns. The problem
was whether or not certain bonuses and royalties received from
oil and gas leases negotiated by the husband on the separate prop-
erty of the wife were community property. The fact was urged
that because of an agreement between the husband and wife giv-
ing the management and control of her property to the husband,
and consideration for his service being one-half of the revenues,
that the proceeds became community property for which a joint
return might be made. Judge Hutcheson in sustaining the deci-
sion of the Board and holding that these revenues were the sep-
arate property of the wife and taxable to her, cited Lucas v. Bau-
cum and said:
".... Boiled down, what the parties were trying to do was to
change the rule of property in Texas that bonuses and royal-
ties from leases on the wife's separate property are her sepa-
rate property, by an agreement that because of Turbeville's
acting for her in negotiating the leases these receipts when
32. Id. at 807, 808.
33. Brown v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 24 B.T.A. 30 (1931).
34. 84 F. (2d) 307 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936).
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obtained should be regarded as community property, one-half
attributable to his management, one-half to her ownership.
This will not do . . . there is nothing in the point that these
receipts were fructus industriales, the result of the husband's
labor on the wife's property. There was no working of the
land, no production from it, by the husband. The only thing he
did was to sell the property and receive the proceeds. It would
be a straining after an unreality having no counterpart in the
facts to hold that anything occurred here but a leasing of peti-
tioner's property under an agreement between petitioner and
her husband that he should have one-half of the proceeds
when and as received."8 5
The case under the "absolute ownership" theory of Texas may not
be authority for Louisiana but the difference in the theory of own-
ership certainly does not alter the nature of the substance which
under either theory involves an alienation in fact of the most val-
uable and irreplacable element of the terrain and hence the con-
clusion should be the same.
Authority to Convey Mineral Rights in Community Property
Community Property in the Name of the Wife: Community
property in Louisiana is in general under the complete control of
the husband who as "head and master"36 of the community, "ad-
ministers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce,
and may alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent
and permission of his wife.' 37 "But when the title to community
property stands in the name of the wife, it cannot be mortgaged
or sold by the husband without her written authority or con-
sent."'38 The latter provision has been given a reciprocal inter-
pretation by the court so that the wife has to have the "written
authority or consent" of the husband to mortgage or sell com-
munity property even though the title stands in her name. 9
The limitations expressed are only in regard to sale or mort-
gage of the property. Would a husband be permitted to sell min-
eral rights without the wife's consent? Clearly not, as this would
be a sale of an immovable, 40 a servitude. Would he be permitted
35. Id. at 309.
36. Art. 2404, La. Civil Code of 1870.
37. Ibid.
38. La. Act 170 of 1912; see Art. 2334, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended
and re-enacted by La. Act 186 of 1920.
39. Bywater v. Enderle, 175 La. 1098, 145 So. 118 (1932).
40. Art. 471, La. Civil Code of 1870.
1938]
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to lease? Under the idea of a predial lease, his general adminis-
trative powers as head of the community would undoubtedly
cover the situation. Under the basic concept of the true meaning
of an oil or gas lease which gives the same right as does the sale,
and under the realistic situation involved, he would in fact be
alienating a part of the land and hence should be prevented from
validly doing so by the limitations of the 1912 statute.4'1 Parallel
problems arise in connection with the similarly worded statute
popularly called the Family Home Act.'2
Community Property in the Name of Husband and Wife:
When community property stands in the names of husband and
wife jointly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has twice held that
it may be sold by the husband without the consent of the wife' s
"notwithstanding Article 2334 of the Civil Code, as amended by
Act 170 of 1912 and by Act 186 of 1920, forbids the husband to sell
or mortgage community property standing in the name of his wife
without her written authority or consent."" There is little doubt
but that under Article 2404 and in their present reactionary mood
on that particular subject the court would not hold valid a sale
made by a wife of community property owned jointly with her
husband.
Community Property in the Name of the Husband: The hus-
band has in general full power to dispose of the community prop-
erty standing in his name but there are certain limitations upon
this power notable among which is the article' 5 forbidding him
to make gifts of the "immovables of the community.' '46 Could he
give away a mineral lease?
USUFRUCTUARY versus NAKED OWNER
While a "usufruct may be established by all sorts of titles" 7
the most frequent creation is "by operation of law.' 8 The legal
41. La. Act 170 of 1912.
42. La. Act 35 of 1921.
43. Young v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 184 La. 460, 166 So. 139 (1936);
Otwell v. Vaughan, 186 La. 911, 173 So. 527 (1937) (strangely enough, both
controversies were over oil lands). See also LeRosen v. North Central Texas
Oil Co., 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1930) and Clingman v. Devonian Oil Co., 188
La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1937).
44. See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice O'Niell, in Clingman v. Devon-
Ian Oil Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59, 60 (1937).
45. Art. 2404, La. Civil Code of 1870; See Daggett, op. cit. supra note 19,
at 23 et seq.
46. See also Family Home Act (La. Act. 35 of 1921); La. Const. of 1921,
Art. XI, § 3 ("Homestead" provisions).
47. Art. 540, La. Civil Code of 1870.
48. Ibid.
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usufructs are the usufruct of the parents upon the property of the
minor child,49 the usufruct of the surviving spouse upon the estate
of the deceased wife or husband under the "marital portion" pro-
vision,50 the usufruct of the so-called "widow's homestead""1 and
the usufruct of the surviving spouse upon the "share of the de-
ceased"6 2 in the community property.58 The last one, falling under
the topic of this paper, is the one most frequently met with and
hence from a practical standpoint the most important, though the
series of articles5' governing usufruct are applicable regardless of
the manner in which the usufruct has been created, and hence the
discussion of mineral rights as affected by the usufruct of the com-
munity share would be pertinent to all other usufructs as well.
The Rights of Usufructuary and Naked Owner to Sell or Lease
Mineral Rights on Undeveloped Land
Usufructuary: It seems clear to the writer, under the articles
of the Civil Code, that an individual owning only a usufruct on
land could not, alone, create a mineral servitude upon it, or in
other words, he could not sell the mineral rights. The whole tenor
of the group of articles on usufruct is against the burdening or
alienating of any element of the ownership of the land. Article
590 is specific in these words: "He is also responsible to the owner
if he permits a servitude to be acquired on the property by pre-
scription." A deliberate creation by conveyance is obviously a
much stronger case. Again, Article 6215 prohibits abuse or waste
on the estate under penalty of forfeiture of the usufruct. Since
the court has very properly declared the leasing for minerals of
land under mortgage to be such a waste as to give the mortgagee
an immediate right of foreclosure,5 6 it should follow that the usu-
fructuary could not lease the land under usufruct for mineral ex-
plorations. This view is supported not only by the clear language
of the code articles but by common law decisions dealing with
the rights of life tenants and remaindermen whose legal position
corresponds perfectly to that of the usufructuary and naked
owner.5 7
49. Arts. 223 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
50. Art. 2382, La. Civil Code of 1870.
51. Art. 3252, La. Civil Code of 1870.
52. Art. 916, La. Civil Code of 1870.
53. See also Art. 2366, La. Civil Code of 1870 (relatively unimportant be-
cause the settling of dowry occurs rarely if ever, today).
54. Art. 533-626, La. Civil Code of 1870.
55. Art. 621, La. Civil Code of 1870.
56. Federal Land Bank v. Mlilhern, 180 La. 627, 157 So. 370 (1934).
57. See Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 176 Ind. 4, 95 N. E. 225, Ann. Cas. 1913E
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While no decision of the problem in Louisiana may be
pointed out, certain cases bearing upon this question may be
noted. In Cochran v. Gulf Refining Co.58 a widow, usufructuary,
granted an extension of a lease given by her deceased husband.
In a subsequent suit to cancel, brought after the death of the usu-
fructuary, the court said:
".... Pretermitting the question whether the widow, as own-
er of one half of the land and usufructuary of the other half,
could bind the co-owners by her contract extending the term
of the lease, she bound herself by that contract; and, by ac-
cepting her succession unconditionally and partitioning the
land that was subject to the lease which she was bound to
respect, her heirs assumed her obligations with respect to the
land, and were thereby bound to recognize the contract of
lease." 59
The case of Sparks v. Dan Cohen Co.60 presented the problem
of a lease given by a life usufructuary on a store building. The
usufructuary leased the property on February 1, 1934, for five
years at $200 per month giving the lessee an option of renewal for
an additional five years at $300 per month. This optimistic usu-
fructuary was then ninety-two years of age and died April 23,
1936. After the death of the usufructuary suit was brought to can-
cel the lease, and the court held the contract terminated under
Articles 555, 606, and 2730 of the Civil Code,61 since parol evidence
showed that the lessee knew that the lessor had only a usufruct.
The court explained that while a warranty obligation in an act of
sale is not extinguished by the death of the warrantor, and sur-
vives as an obligation of his succession, "the obligation of a lessor,
to warrant and defend the lessee's right of possession of the leased
premises, survives as an obligation of the succession of the lessor,
in the event of his death before the expiration of the term of the
836 (1911) and excellent collection of notes by Kulp, Cases on Oil and Gas
(2 ed. St. Paul 1935) 84; Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 36 Atl. 201, 35 L.R.A.
816, 57 Am. St. Rep. 601 (1897) "which holds that, where no oil or gas opera-
tions have been commenced on land before an estate for life has accrued,
the tenant for life has no right to operate for oil or gas himself, and cannot
give such a right to any person by lease." Kulp, supra, at 87.
58. 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916).
59. 139 La. 1010, 1018, 72 So. 718, 720 (1916).
60. 187 La. 830, 175 So. 590 (1937).
61. Art. 555, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The usufructuary may enjoy by him-
self or lease to another, or even sell or give away his right; but all the con-
tracts or agreements which he makes in this respect, whatever duration he
may have intended to give them, cease of right at the expiration of the usu-
fruct."
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lease, only in cases where the lessor claimed or pretended to be
the owner of the leased premises-not in cases where the lessor
claimed to be-and was in fact-only the usufructuary of the
leased premises. ' 62
The Cochran case6 8 was distinguished on the ground that the
oil lease there involved was treated as a sale, though the court
did not make that the basis of the decision. Chief Justice O'Niell
pointed out in the Sparks case6" that an oil lease is more a sale of a
real right than an ordinary lease, a fact that was recognized by the
court on many occasions and notably in the cases of Rives V. Gulf
Refining Co.65 and Nabors Oil and Gas Company6 which were the
bases for the decision of the Cochran case. The Sparks case,
while not dealing with an oil lease, is of particular interest
not only because of its discussion of the Cochran case but because
it was decided since the Glassell case,6 7 which Chief Justice
O'Niell suggested was not in accord with the idea of those cases
which were the foundation of the Cochran case (distinguished
from the Sparks case as being an oil lease which was more in the
nature of a sale than a lease).68
The right to "lease" given to the usufructuary by Article 55569
of the Civil Code clearly had no reference at its framing to the
unknown contract of searching for oil. But if for sake of argument
its applicability is admitted, the term of the lease must cease upon
the death or remarriage of the usufructuary under Article 916
which would obviously make the life of the contract entirely too
Art. 606, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The right of the usufruct expires at the
death of the usufructuary."
Art. 2730, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A lease made by one having a right of
usufruct, ends when the right of usufruct ceases. The lessee has no right to
an indemnification from the heirs of the lessor, if the lessor has made known
to him the title under which he possessed."
62. 187 La. 830, 843, 175 So. 590, 594 (1937).
63. Cochran v. Gulf Refining Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916).
64. Sparks v. Dan Cohen Co., 187 La. 830, 175 So. 590 (1937).
65. 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
66. Nabors Oil and Gas Co. v. La. Oil Refining Corp., 151 La. 361, 91 So.
765 (1922).
67. Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
68. The case of Stinson v. Marston, 185 La. 365, 169 So. 436 (1936) should
also be noted in connection with this resum6 of cases for the following state-
ment: "The contention of plaintiffs that the option expired on the death of
Mrs. Nina Vance because the lease or the option to lease, ceased of right at
the expiration of the usufruct is without merit, in our opinion." This state-
ment is unsupported and it is notable that in the Sparks decision rendered a
year later this case was not referred to nor has it been cited elsewhere ac-
cording to Shepard's Citator.
69. See note 61, supra, for provisions of Art. 555, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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uncertain for risk of the investment necessary to develop an oil
lease.
Naked Owner: The naked owner of the land cannot sell the
mineral rights, so as to create a servitude, "unless it be done in
such a manner as to be of no injury to the usufructuary. ' 0 Cer-
tainly any conceivable development of an oil servitude would in-
terfere with the enjoyment of the ordinary usufruct. The whole
section "Of the Obligations of the Owner" 71 would preclude the
leasing of the land for development during the usufruct, because
the affirmative rights given to the usufructuary would obviously
negate a leasing privilege to the naked owner.
Usufructuary and Naked Owner-Division of Compensation:
There would seem to be no good reason why the usufructuary and
naked owner could not join in a sale or lease of the undeveloped
mineral rights since between them exists perfect ownership of
the land and each is specifically given the right to alienate his
holding subject to the other's rights.7 2 If they contract 78 for the
division of the returns, obviously there is no problem; if legal
division is involved, a troublesome question is raised.
Commentators on usufruct, considering this personal servi-
tude of Roman law 7' through its development to the modern con-
cept, have compared the device to the life estate of the common
law. The "naked owner" obviously corresponds to the remainder-
man. Since there are no Louisiana decisions on the question, the
common law method of handling problems which involve the
rights of life tenant and remainderman may serve as a fair and
valuable guide and should be considered. A most interesting case
on this subject and one of particular interest to Louisiana law-
yers is Barnes v. Keys 7' (from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma,
a state adhering to the non-ownership theory) which presents the
70. Art. 602, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Art. 600, La. Civil Code of
1870.
71. Arts. 599-606, La. Civil Code of 1870.
72. Arts. 555, 605, La. Civil Code of 1870.
73. See Superior Oil Producing Company v. Leckelt, 189 La. 972, 181 So.
462 (1938). It is not stated whether usufruct was involved or not but on the
face it appears probable. Note the following excerpt: "This property was
acquired during the community of Gotlieb Leckelt and his deceased wife,
Matilda Leckelt, who died on March 1, 1924. At the time the lease was exe-
cuted Gotlieb Leckelt owned a one-half undivided interest in the property and
each of the children owned an undivided one-tenth interest in the property."
(181 So. 462, 463.)
74. Max Radin, Handbook of Roman Law (1927) 380.
75. 36 Okl. 6, 127 Pac. 261, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 178, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 515
(1912); See in Kulp, op. cit. supra note 57, at 81.
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question of how the royalties should be shared where both life
tenant and remainderman had joined in the lease. The life tenant
had a life expectancy of about thirty-eight years. The taking of
the oil was said to be in effect a sale of the land and hence it was
held that the remainderman should have the proceeds, and the
income therefrom should go to the owner of the life estate, or
that the latter should have such a sum as would produce thirty-
eight annual payments at six per cent. The following quotation
from the opinion gives insight into the sound reasoning of the
court and by the introduction of the case of Blakely v. Marshall
further develops the analogy to the usufruct, which has been
called the "civil law substitute for common law trusts.
7 7
"The question is, all having agreed that the lease should
be made, what interest should each have in the income from
the lease? It would seem that their interests would be the
same as if that much land had been sold. The life tenant would
be entitled to the income from the purchase price, that is, to
interest during his life. The remaindermen would be entitled
to the whole amount upon the death of the life tenant. This
rule is supported by the authorities. In Blakely v. Marshall,
174 Pa. 425, 34 A. 564, the court said: 'Acting for themselves in
their own right as tenants for life, and also as trustees for those
in remainder, the plaintiffs executed the lease to N. B. Duncan,
"for the purpose of operating and drilling for petroleum and
gas," for the term of 15 years from August 10, 1894, "and so
long thereafter as oil and gas can be produced in paying quan-
tities." It was obviously necessary, as well as to the interest of
both the tenants for life and the remaindermen, that they
should thus unite in the lease, because no practical oil operator
would undertake the development of supposed oil territory on
the faith of a lease from life tenants only, and for the further
and more important reason that, if not promptly developed
and worked, the land would soon have been drained of its oil
through wells on adjoining lands'. '78
Article 62179 of the Louisiana Civil Code, providing for termi-
nation of a usufruct because of abuse or waste, directs that "the
judge may, according to the circumstances, decree the absolute
76. 174 Pa. 425, 34 At. 564 (1896).
77. See Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Common Law Trusts (1927)
36 Yale L. J. 1126.
78. 36 Okl. 6, 127 Pac. 261, 262 (1912).
79. See Francez v. Francez, 152 La. 666, 94 So. 203 (1922) for application
of this article.
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extinction of the usufruct, or order that the owner shall re-enter
into the enjoyment of the property subject to the usufruct, on con-
dition that he shall pay annually to the usufructuary, or his repre-
sentatives, until the usufruct expires, a sum which shall be fixed
on by the judge in proportion to the value of the property subject
to the usufruct." The second solution is similar to the reckoning
device employed in Barnes v. Keys. The provisions for imperfect
usufruct 0 of things which must be consumed to be enjoyed, such
as cotton,81 groceries, 2 money,2 furnish the clearest and fairest
analogy for oil and gas, certainly consumables.
The case of Orndorff v. Consumers' Fuel Co. 4 presented a
situation where the remaindermen leased but could not give pos-
session or entry; this would clearly be the case if a "naked owner"
in Louisiana saw fit to lease or sell without the consent and assist-
ance of the usufructuary. The life tenant then gave a lease grant-
ing possession, which the court found he had a right to do, saying:
"We cannot subscribe to the position of the Consumers'
Company that Anderson had no estate in the' land nor the right
to place an oil and gas lease thereon. He could not grant the oil
and gas rights without the joinder of the remaindermen (Mar-
shall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 36 A. 201, 35 L.R.A. 816, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 601), but, in virtue of his life tenancy when they had
granted their interest, he could deal on his own account for
possession of the property which the lessee could not acquire
against him.
''8 5
The owner of the life estate enjoyed his right "as tenant by the
curtesy," the common law quasi-equivalent for the usufruct of
the surviving spouse upon the deceased spouse's share of the com-
munity. He asked, according to his lease, for one-sixth-a child's
share-of the one-eighth royalty produced during his life time
and was awarded that amount by the court. Apparently, had he
asked in time, he could also have had the value of the remainder-
80. Arts. 534, 536, 549, La. Civil Code of 1870.
81. Succession of Hayes, 33 La. Ann. 1144 (1881).
82. Succession of Blancand, 48 La. Ann. 580, 19 So. 683 (1896).
83. Michel v. Knox, 34 La. Ann. 399 (1882); Heirs of Gryder v. Gryder,
37 La. Ann. 638 (1885); Tutorship of the Minor Heirs of Jones, 41 La. Ann. 623,
6 So. 180 (1889). See also Miguez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 176, 51 So. 108 (1910)
(notes); Vivian State Bank v. Thomason-Lewis Lumber Co., 162 La. 660, 111
So. 51 (1927) (time deposits); and discussion of problem n Comment (1929) 4
Tulane L. Rev. 104.
84. 308 Pa. 165, 162 Atl 431 (1932); See in Kulp, op. cit. supra note 57, at
85.
85. 308 Pa. 165, 162 Atl. 431, 433 (1932).
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man's one-eighth royalty impounded so as to receive the interest
on it during his life. These cases and many others88 furnish fair
and practical analogies for the division of consideration and roy-
alty where naked owner and usufructuary join in a sale or lease of
the mineral rights. Since the necessity for development is appar-
ent and since oil and gas or their value is a consumable thing,
the provisions and decisions for imperfect usufruct in Louisiana
fit the new situation perfectly.
The Rights of Usufructuary and Naked Owner to Sell or Lease
Mineral Rights on Developed Land
The next problem to be considered is that of the rights of the
usufructuary and naked owner upon land under development. If
the land comes to the usufructuary burdened with a mineral
servitude, he will be "bound to suffer the servitude which existed
on the land of which he has the usufruct at the time his right
commenced. 8 7 If the right to explore for minerals was conferred
by a lease contract this grant will be protected under the preced-
ing article if the court takes what would appear to be the only
logical view, that substantively the right is the same, whatever
the form of the contract granting it. However that may be, under
the specific terms of the law of lease, the contract is not affected
by the death8 8 of the lessor, so in any event the usufructuary is
bound as is the naked owner. The interesting problem in this con-
nection is the question of the disposition of the "rent" or "royalty"
from the lease.
The usufruct in this situation should be, in the writer's judg-
ment, upon the proceeds of the lease-not upon the land. One
article of the Civil Code stands in the way of this conclusion. Ar-
ticle 552 stipulates that: "The usufructuary has a right to the en-
joyment and proceeds of mines and quarries in the land subject to
the usufruct, if they were actually worked before the commence-
ment of the usufruct; but he has no right to mines and quarries
not opened."
It "was not until 1910 that oil and gas were classed with
'other minerals' ,,89 and certainly were not in the contemplation
of the redactors of that article. An oil well is certainly not a
quarry and is not a mine within the understanding of the legisla-
86. See collection by Kulp, op. cit. supra note 57, at 84.
87. Art. 565, La. Civil Code of 1870.
88. Art. 2731, La. Civil Code of 1870.
89. See Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Murrell, Tax Collector, 127 La. 466, 53 So.
705 (1910).
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tive composers of that date.90 In discussing misnomers applied in
the oil and gas industry, Mr. Glassmire says:
"... The misleading term 'oil and gas mining lease' reminds
one of the school-boy's definition of a crab, as being a 'red fish
that crawls backwards.' Such a superficial likeness might ap-
pear conclusive were it not for the fact that a crab is not red,
does not crawl backwards and is not a fish. At least this much
might be well said of our present lease contract: oil and gas
are not 'mined,' the contract isn't a 'mining lease or license'
proper, and for most intents and purposes it isn't a lease at all.
Its distinctive features, however, do not depend on its name,
but rather on its legal effect and significance." 9' 1
Admitting for purposes of argument the applicability of Article
552, its wording, nevertheless, suggests producing mines worked by
the usufructuary himself or by his lessees,92 which is hardly a
practical situation in oil development. Due to the cost of oil pro-
duction it is rare indeed that the simple land owner is himself
the producer. If the well is producing under a valid lease, the usu-
fructuary should then be entitled to the usufruct of a certain
amount of oil or money, consumable things, which may be dis-
posed of at the pleasure of the usufructuary "but under the obli-
gation of returning the same quantity, quality and value to the
owner, or their estimated price, at the expiration of the usu-
fruct."9 8 Under the language of Article 552, it is only when the
land is "subject to the usufruct'""4 that the usufructuary has a
right to the "enjoyment and proceeds of the mines." The land in
the hypothesis discussed is not subject to the usufruct but to the
lease" and it is the lessor's interest in the lease over which the
usufruct is enjoyed. Certainly that might be true of an ordinary
predial lease. To follow this reasoning further, however, it might
well be to argue that the rent coming to the usufructuary would
be his as a civil fruit, so again the analysis has to be bottomed
finally upon the fact that an oil and gas lease involves a severance
of the realty itself and has no likeness in fact to a predial lease.
No support is found in common law jurisdictions for this in-
terpretation of Article 552. In dealing with the rights of the life
tenant and remainderman, the same regulation is found as that
90. See also Art. 2738, La. Civil Code of 1870.
91. Glassmire, op. cit. supra note 10, at 68. (Italics supplied.)
92. See also Art. 551, La. Civil Code of 1870.
93. Art. 549, La. Civil Code of 1870.
94. Italics supplied.
95. See Arts. 2730, 2731, La. Civil Code of 1870.
[Vol. I
MINERAL RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY
of the Louisiana 6 and French 7 codal provisions. According to
Thornton, the life tenant coming to his estate where wells are
producing is entitled to the royalty.98 Similarly, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court has said:
"It is settled by a long line of decisions, beginning with
Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 402, that a life tenant cannot open
new mines, but that, where mines are already opened, the life
tenant may work them. ... The doctrine or theory of these
cases is that the opening of new mines is a permanent injury
to the inheritance constituting waste. In other words, it is held
that the minerals are part of the land itself, and that the life
tenant has no right to take the minerals, any more than he
would have the right to sell or dispose of a part of the surface
of the land."100
The fallacy of the logic of granting the minerals to a life tenant
simply because the mine happened to be open when his right ac-
crued is apparent. Certainly, the minerals are still as much a
"part of the land" as they were before. The waste of the title or
permanent inheritance is the same in either case.
If usufruct in Louisiana commonly arose by contract, the
question might seem unimportant. It usually comes into existence
by operation of the law, and is created most frequently by the ac-
cident of death. If at the moment of that act of God the property
is not under lease, then neither the naked owner nor the usu-
fructuary may alone develop the property and they must share
equitably in the enjoyment of this valuable part of the land. Each
has protection against the other's failure to abide. "The usufruc-
96. Art. 552, La. Civil Code of 1870.
97. Art. 598, French Civil Code (English translation by Cachard, rev. ed.
1930): "He has also the enjoyment, in the same way as the owner, of the
mines and quarries which are being worked, when the usufruct begins;
but, nevertheless, if such working cannot be carried on without a concession,
the usufructuary can only have the enjoyment thereof after he has obtained
the permission of the King (President of the Republic).
"He has no right to the mines and quarries which have not yet been
opened, nor to the turf pits which have not been worked, nor to the treasure-
trove which may be discovered during the continuance of the usufruct."
98. See 2 Thornton, The Law of Oil and Gas (1932) ch. 10.
99. Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 460 (1823); Lenfers v. Henke, 73 Ill.
405, 24 Am. Rep. 263 (1874); Hendrix v. McBeth, 61 Ind. 473, 28 Am. Rep. 680
(1878); Seager v. McCabe, 92 Mich. 186, 52 N. W. 299, 16 L.R.A. 247 (1892); Wil-
son v. Youst [Hughes], 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781, 39 L.R.A. 292 (1897); 10
Ballard's Real Property (1905) 450; Blakely v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564
(1896). (Found in Barnes v. Keys, 36 Okl. 6, 127 Pac. 261, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 178,
Ann. Cases 1915A 515 (1912) ).
100. Barnes v. Keys, 36 Okl. 6, 127 Pac. 261, 262. See Kulp, op. cit. supra
note 57, at p. 82.
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tuary can maintain all actions against the owner and third
persons, which may be necessary to insure him the possession, en-
joyment and preservation of his right."' 0'11 The naked owner may
cause the termination of the usufruct if the usufructuary gives a
mineral lease which has been held as to a mortgagee to be
"waste. '10 2 If, however, a lease exists on the land when death oc-
curs, then under what may be the popular interpretation of Ar-
ticle 552 the "proceeds" of the well, doubtless the main value of
the inheritance, will go in perpetual ownership to the usufruc-
tuary, and the land may be returned to its owners exhausted of
its richness and in many cases made valueless even for farming
or any other purpose.
The fact that no comfort is found in common law authority
for the author's view is not particularly disturbing and is more
than counterbalanced by the civil law interpretations of the
French commentators. 08 These writers were found to be in accord
-to an unhoped for extent-with what in the writer's judgment
is the only equitable view to be taken of the mine and quarry ar-
ticle. Furthermore, the stupidity and injustice of Article 598104
of the French Code, from which our Article 552 was taken, was
hard fought as early as in the conferences held by the framers
of the Code Napoleon.
The projet prepared by commissioners of the government in
the year eight of the Republic of France (1800) contained the fol-
lowing provision: "Les mines et carri~res ne sont pas comprises
dans l'usufruit."'' 5 In commenting upon this provision, Laurent
says: "The commission charged with the redaction of a projet of
the civil code had formulated the true principles in declaring that
'mines and quarries were not comprised within the usufruct.' All
that the usufructuary would have been able to claim, was to en-
joy the interest of the capital extracted from the earth, as he had
the right to enjoy other capitals."'10 0 The projet was presented
101. Art. 556, La. Civil Code of 1870; See Dellinger v. Smith, 142 La. 1009,
77 So. 947 (1918) (usufructuary brought suit to cancel).
102. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Mulhern, 180 La. 627, 157 So.
870 (1934).
103. The writer is indebted to DeVan D. Daggett, II, A.B. (Louisiana
State University) LL.B. (Yale) presently graduate student in Louisiana State
University Law School, for the research in French sources.
104. For text of Art. 598, French Civil Code, see note 97, supra.
105. Projet de la Commission du Gouvernement, an VIII (1800), liv. II,
tit. III, art. 23, found in 2 Fenet, Recueil Complet des Travaux Pr~paratoires
du Code Civil (1836) 110.
106. "La commission chargde de la rddaction d'un projet de code civil
avait formuld les vrais principes en ddclarant que Iles mines et carridres
n'dtaient pas comprises dans Zusufruit." Tout ce que l'usufruitier aurait pu
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to the various courts of France, and Laurent states that the pro-
test of the Court of Lyons, based on the "existing jurisprudence, '10 7
was responsible for the rejection of this provision and for the
article which was adopted in the Code Napoleon-and hence for
the present Louisiana codal provision. The commissioners named
by the Court of Appeal of Lyons, made the observation that "....
in general, it is only the discovery of quarries and the produce of
metal mines which are prohibited to the usufructuary by the
present jurisprudence." ' However, according to Laurent, the
article'019 as finally adopted went much further than the "old law."
His comment follows:
"But the old law did not go as far as the civil code. The
Roman law is not authority on this matter; the most emi-
nent jurists believed that the interior products of the soil re-
newed themselves like fruits, or that at least they were inex-
haustible.1 0 This is a double error. The richest mines will in
the end be exhausted; if men are not frightened by that pros-
pect, however certain it may be, it is because they, feeble crea-
tures, are only preoccupied with their own life-time interests,
and hardly worry about what will happen in the centuries to
come. Daily experience constantly contradicts the Roman
jurists. In the old law, they had restrained the rights of the
usufructuary; they only permitted him to continue the exploi-
tation begun by the proprietor in the exceptional case where
the mine was so abundant that it appeared in some way inex-
haustible."' The idea was just, even though it rested upon an
incorrect supposition. It was desired that the usufructuary
should not consume the substance of the thing, and that at the
end of the usufruct he should return an enjoyment nearly
equal to that which he had received. But that is impossible;
therefore the usufructuary should have only the enjoyment of
the products, and account for the capital to the naked owner. 1 2
rdclamer, c'dtait de jouir de l'ntr6t du capital extrait de la terre, comme il a
Io droit de iouir des autres capitaux." 6 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil
Frangais (2 ed. 1876) 564, no 448.
107. 6 Laurent, id. at 564.
108. "En g~ndral, il n'y a que la ddcouverte des carrieres et Ie produit
des mines de mdtaux qui soient prohibes 6 l'usufruitier par la jurispru-
dence actuelle." 4 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 105, at 102.
109. Art. 598, French Civil Code, as set out in note 97, supra.
110. "Ulpien, dans la loi 7, § 1, D., solut. matrim. (XXIV, 3); Ducaurroy,
Bonnier et Roustain, t. II, p. 120, no 185." (note 2, in 6 Laurent 564)
111.."Pothier, Douaire, no 196; Communautd, no 97. Merlin, Rdpertoire,
au mot Carri~re." (note 3, in 6 Laurent 564).
112. "Mais l'ancien droit n'allait pas aussi loin que Is code civil. Le droit
romain est sans autoritm en cette matidre; les jurisconsultes les plus dminents
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The discussion in the French Conseil d'Etat at the time of the
adoption of the projet as reported was not concerned so much
with the provision under discussion in this paper as with the
matter of government concessions. 118
Laurent." comments on Gary's"18 exposition in the following
manner:
"According to the terms of Article 598, 'the usufructuary
enjoys, in the same manner as the proprietor, the mines and
quarries which are in exploitation at the time of the opening
of the usufruct; he has no right to mines and quarries not yet
open.' The orator of the Tribune said that this disposition is a
consequence of the principle that the usufructuary enjoys like
the proprietor, in conserving the substance of the thing. If the
mines are open when the usufruct begins, the usufructuary
will continue to enjoy them; but he will never be authorized
to open any if the proprietor has not done so, because he must
enjoy as the proprietor did, without being able to destroy the
croyatent quo les produits intdrieurs du sol se renouvelatent comme les fruits,
ou quo du moins ils dtaient indpuisables. Double erreur. Les mines les plus
riches fnlnront par s'dpuiser; st les hommes ne s'effrayent pas de cot avenir,
quelque certain qu'il soit, c'est que, faibles crdatures, is no se preoccupent
que de lours intdrets viagers, et ne s'inquiitent gure de ce qui arrivera dans
des sidcles. Toujours est-il que l'expdrience journalifre donne un dementi aux
jurisconsultes romains. Dans P'ancien droit, on avait restreint les droits de
l'usufruitier; on ne lui permettait de continuer l'exploitation commencte par
Ie propridtaire que dans lo cas exceptionnel o& la mine 6tait si abondante
qu'elle paraissait en quelque sorte indpuisablo. L'idde dtait juste, bien qu'elle
reposdt sur une supposition inexacte. On voulait que l'usufrultier ne con-
sommdt pas la substance de la chose, et qu'il rendit d la fin de l'usufruit, une
joulssance d peu pres dgale 4 celle qu'il avait reue. Mais cola est impossible;
donc l'usufrultier ne devrait avoir que la jouissance des produits, et tenir
compte du capital au nu proprietaire." 6 Laurent, loc. cit. supra note 106.
113. 11 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 105, at 179 et seq.
114. "Aux termes de l'article 598, 'l'usufruitier joult, de la meme manldro
quo Is propridtaire, des mines et carridres qui sont en exploitation lors de
l'ouverture de l'usufruit; il n'a aucun drolt aux mines et carridres non encore
ouvertes.' L'orateur du Tribunat dit que cette disposition est une consdquence
du principe que l'usufruitier jouit comme le propridtaire, en conservant la
substance de la chose. Si les mines sont ouvertes au moment de l'ouverture
de Ilusufruit, l'usufruitior continuera d'en joulr; mals il no sera jamais auto-
ris6 4 en ouvrir quand Is propridtaire ne l'a pas fait, parce qu'il doit jouir
comme le propridtaire jouissait et sans pouvoir ddnaturer la substance do
Phdritage soumls d lusufrult. Ces motifs no sont pas trds-juridiques. Oui,
l'usufrultier jouit comme Is propridtaire, mats des fruits, et non du capital.
Or, les produits des mines et carridres ne sont certes pas un fruit; c'est une
partie du fonds, clest donc la substance de la chose quo lexploitant dpulse
successivement; comment l'usufrutier aurat-il le droit d'exploiter les mines
et carridres, lui qui doit conserver la substance P" 6 Laurent, op. cit. supra
note 106, at 563, no 448.
115. Discours Prononc6 par le Tribun Gary devant le Corps L~gislatif.
11 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 105, at 228 et seq.
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substance of the property subjected to the usufruct."" These
reasons are not very juridical. To be sure, the usufructuary en-
joys like the proprietor, but he enjoys the fruits, and not the
capital. Now, the products of mines and quarries are certainly
not a fruit, but a part of the ground. It is therefore the sub-
stance of the thing which the exploiter successively depletes;
how could the usufructuary have the right to exploit the mines
and quarries, when he must conserve the substance?"'117
It is interesting to note the close similarity between the errone-
ous reasoning on the protection of the substance criticized by Lau-
rent and that of the common law jurists indicated above.
Gary's discussion 118 does disclose, however, according to his
interpretation, that under the Roman law mining was only al-
lowed to the usufructuary when the deposits were located in areas
which had no agricultural value or when the mining would not
interfere with cultivation. It will be seen, therefore, that the
French Civil Code, while following the Roman provision of per-
mitting the .usufructuary to enjoy the mines, departed from the
Roman idea and limitation in order to suit the changed condi-
tions of their time."l9 Louisiana might well follow the French
example and modulate to suit her time and the new substance in-
volved. Certainly, Louisiana should not feel bound by a theory
originating in the Roman law and modified by the French, when
even the French modulation was severely criticized in 1800. Con-
ditions in regard to oil and gas are so foreign to both the Roman
and the old French concepts that adherence to the old provisions
seems marked stupidity.
It is interesting to note that the Civil Code of the Province of
Quebec includes in the article dealing with mines and quarries
both the provision of the unadopted projet of the Code Napoleon
that "mines and quarries are not comprised in the usufruct of
land" and the substance of the French and Louisiana provisions
expressed in these words: "If however these quarries, before the
opening of the usufruct, have been worked as a source of revenue
by the proprietor, the usufructuary may continue such working
in the way in which it has been begun."'120
116. "Gary, Discours, no 14 (Locr6, t. IV, p. 139)" (note 2, 6 Laurent
563) (also reported in 11 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 105, at 234).
117. "Hennequin, Trat6 de lgislation, t. II, p. 298, et sulv." (note 1, in 6
Laurent 564)
118. Supra note 115, at 234 et seq.
119. See comments by Laurent, supra note 112; and by Gary, supra note
11M
120. Art. 460, Quebec Civil Code (1937).
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What is Developed Land? Again, a plague of litigation may
arise out of what may be the popular interpretation of Louisiana's
article on mines and quarries. What would constitute an "opened"
oil well? Would the fact that a lease had once been given, that
unsuccessful operations had been begun, that a geophysical sur-
vey had been made, that a shallow strata had been worked, con-
stitute an "open mine or quarry"? Some of these questions have
been answered in common law jurisdictions,12 1 and others have
not. The analogies to be found in the decisions on "user" of servi-
tude are far from satisfactory for the solution of a problem which
has its roots in rights of such a different nature. Laurent gives
serious consideration to these problems presented by the French
article. A lengthy extract may be pardoned since material on the
topic is so scanty and his remarks are so pertinent. Of course, his
reference to that portion of the French article dealing with gov-
ernment concessions122 does not concern Louisiana but his analysis
even in that regard is valuable.12
3
"Of mines of which the exploitation was commenced. The
essential condition required by the law in order that the usu-
fructuary may enjoy the mines, is that they be in exploitation
at the time of the opening of the usufruct (art. 598). When
121. See Thornton, op. cit. supra note 98.
122. Art. 598, French Civil Code (English translation by Cachard, rev. ed.
1930): ". . . but, nevertheless, if such working cannot be carried on without
a concession, the usufructuary can only have the enjoyment thereof after he
has obtained the permission of the King (President of the Republic.)."
123. "Des Mines dont l'Exploitation 6tait Commenc~e. La condition essen-
tielle requise par la loi pour que l'usufruitier jouisse des mines, c'est qu'elles
soient en exploitation lors de l'ouverture de l'usufruit (art. 598). Quand peut-
on dire que les mines sont en exploitation? C'est une question de fait plutOt
que de drolt. En effet, sur quoi se base Ie droit de l'usufruitier? Sur la
jouissance du propridtaire, que l'usufruitier continue. Or, la jouissance est un
fait, et, dans l'esp~ce, il faut ajouter qu'il y a une question d'intention. La
mine est un capital; Ze propridtaire a-t-il l'lntention d'employer ce capital
pour s'en faire un revenu? Dans ce cas, il y a exploitation, et par suite l'usu-
fruitier pourra la continuer."
"Il se peut mdme que I'usufruitier n'ait aucun droit ni 4 Z'exploitation, ni
d la redevance. Nous avons dit plus haut (no 247) que la concession d'une
mine a pour effet de ddmembrer la proprit ; la mine est sdparde de ld
superficie, et forme une propridtd distincte. On peut donc avoir l'usufruit de
la superftcie sans avoir l'usufruit de la mine, et r~ciproquement; et l'on peut
aussi avoir l'usufruit de l'une et de l'autre. Tout depend de la volontd des
parties intdressdes. La question de savoir si V'usufruit porte sur la superficie,
sur 7a mine ou sur l'une et l'autre, sera d~cidde par l'acte constitutif de l'usu-
fruit.
i"L'application de ces principes donne lieu 4 quelques difficultds. On sup-
pose que le propridtaire a fait des travaux de recherche ayant pour objet de
ddcouvrir la mine. Est-ce l un commencement d'exploitationt Non fvi-
demment. On ne peut pas dire qu'une mine soit exploitde alors que l'on ne
sait pas encore s'll y a une mine. Vainement dirait-on que le propridtaire a
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might one say that mines are in exploitation? That is a ques-
tion of fact more than of law. In effect, upon what is the right
of the usufructuary based? Upon the enjoyment of the prop-
rietor, which the usufructuary continues. But, the enjoyment
is a fact, and, in that event, it must be added that there is a
question of intention. The mine is capital; did the proprietor
have the intention of employing that capital to obtain a reve-
nue? In that case, there is exploitation, and consequently the
usufructuary will be able to continue it.124
"It is even possible that the usufructuary has no right, ei-
ther to the exploitation, or to the revenue. We have said
above (no. 247) that the concession of a mine has the effect
of dismembering the property; the mine is separated from the
superficies, and forms a distinct property. One may thus have
the usufruct of the superficies without having the usufruct
of the mine, and vice versa; and one may also have the usu-
fruct of the one and the other. Everything depends upon the
will of the interested parties. The question of knowing wheth-
er the usufruct bears upon the superficies, upon the mine or
upon one and the other, will be decided by the act constituting
the usUfruct.
125
"The application of these principles gives rise to several
difficulties. If the proprietor has made some research for the
manifestd l'intention d'expZoiter la mine; on rdpond, et Za r~ponse est p~remp-
toire que l'intention est n~cessaire, mais qu'elle ne suffit point; il taut encore
le fait de la Jouissance. Et cela est tres-Zogique. En faisant des recherches
pour d~couvrir une mine, Ze propridtaire manifeste certainement la volontd
de I'exploiter, mais d une condition, c'est que la mine soit assez riche pour
donner un bdnuf!ce aprus que les frais Z'ouverture et d'expZoitation seront
payds. Ii se peut done trds-bien que la recherche de la mine ne soit pas suivie
do V'explottation.
"'L'usufruit est constitud apr6s que le propridtaire a obtenu la concession;
mais l'exploitation n'a pas commencd lors de l'ouverture de Z'usufruit. Est-ce
que Z'usufruitier aura Ze droit de la commencer! I1 faut d'abord voir si
P'usufruitier a droit d la mine, c'est-d-dire si Z'usufruit ne porte pas exclusive-
ment sur la surface. S'il est constant que P'usufruit porte sur la mine, U1 taut
ddcider que P'usufruitier peut l'exploiter, non pas en vertu de article 598,
qui exige que 1'exploitation ait commencd, mais en vertu do l'intention du
constituant. Voidi un cas qui s'est prdsent6 devant La cour de Lyon. Un testa-
tour lgue f sa femme l'usufruit do tous se biens; il Ldgue d son neveu tous
ses immeubles et notamment Ze cinquiume de la concession d'une mine. La
cour d~cida que L'usufruit comprenait ce cinqui~me. Dis lors L'usufruitier
avait Ze droit de i'exploiter, puisque c'est L'exploitation meme qui lui 6tait
ldgude. Mais si Ze titre constitutif de Lusufruit ne d6dcde pas la question, 4
faut appliquer L'article 598 .. ." 6 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 106, at 565-567,
nos 449, 450.
124. "Aubry et Rau, t. II, p. 485, note 32 et les autoritis qui y sont cities."
(note 1, in 6 Laurent 565)
125. "Genty, De L'usufruit, p. 111, no 140." (note 2, in 6 Laurent 565)
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discovery of a mine, is that a commencement of exploitation?
Obviously not. One cannot say that a mine is being exploited
when it is not yet known whether there is a mine. It may be
said in vain that the proprietor has manifested the intention
of exploiting the mine; one replies, and the reply is peremp-
tory, that the intention is necessary, but that it does not suffice;
there is also necessary the fact of the enjoyment. And that is
very logical. In making the search to discover a mine, the
proprietor certainly manifests the will to exploit it, but upon
one condition, that the mine be sufficiently rich to give a profit.
after the costs of opening and of exploitation will have been
paid. It is thus quite possible that the prospecting for the
mine may not be followed by exploitation. 26
"If the usufruct is constituted after the proprietor has ob-
tained the concession, but the exploitation was not begun un-
til after the opening of the usufruct, will the usufructuary have
the right to commence it? It is first necessary to see if the
usufructuary has a right to the mine, that is to say if the usu-
fruct does not bear exclusively upon the surface. If it is cer-
tain that the usufruct bears on the mine, it is necessary to de-
cide whether the usufructuary may exploit it, not by virtue of
article 598, which requires that the exploitation be commenced,
but by virtue of the intention of the constituent. Here is a case
which was presented before the court of Lyons. A testator
wills to his wife the usufruct of all his goods; he wills to his
nephew all his immovables and particularly the fifth of the
concession of a mine. The court decided that the usufruct in-
cluded that fifth. Hence the usufructuary had the right to ex-
ploit it, since it is the exploitation itself which was willed to
him. 127 But if the title constituting the usufruct did not decide
the question, it would be necessary to apply article 598 .... "128
The writer has the highest personal and professional regard
for the framers of the recent Proposed Mineral Code for Louisiana
and for the scholarly work behind that proposed code. It was a
126. "Demolombe, t. X, p. 378, no 432, et Dalloz, au mot Usufruit, no
326." (note 1, in 6 Laurent 566)
127. "Lyon ler juillet 1840, Dalloz, au mot Usufruit, no 327." (note 2,
in 6 Laurent 566)
128. In the omitted portion, reference is made to the following: Lyon, 24
mai 1853, Dalloz, 1855, 2, 347; Loi du 10 avril 1810, art. 42; Proudhon, t. III, no
1206; Duranton, t. IV, no 569; Demolombe, t. X, nos 432 et 436; Dalloz, au mot
Mines, nos 297 et suiv." (notes in 6 Laurent 567)
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keen disappointment, however, to find the article129 which would
perpetuate the old principles of the present law, condemned by
famous French jurists even before its official appearance in the
Code Napoleon; awkward, inequitable and unsuited to mineral
rights in Louisiana. It is the hope of the author, that, if and when
the mineral code is again offered to the Legislature for acceptance,
a modification of these provisions may be effected, or that in the
interim, the courts may see fit to place a different interpretation
upon the old article of the Civil Code or decree its entire inappli-
cability to the modem problem.
So called "bonuses" would ordinarily follow the contract to
which they are attached as additional compensation and should
present little trouble per se after the major problems of royalty in
its various uses are settled. Delay rentals in mineral lease con-
tracts represent an intermediary stage and have left a query in
the minds of commentators30 on life estate versus remaindermen
which will certainly arise to perplex commentators on usufruc-
tuary versus naked owner and community property problems. As
Laurent has said in another connection "One cannot say that a
mine has been exploited when he does not yet know if there is a
mine."'1 1 Mr. Glassmire comments as follows:
"The [lease] contract in no sense resembles a house or
farm lease, nor has such a lease contract the distinctive char-
acteristics of an ordinary leasehold. The estate is granted for
certain considerations, and the incidental 'rentals and royal-
ties' are not rent moneys paid for the use of land and tene-
129. Art. 42, Second Revised Draft of the Mineral Code, prepared for the
1938 session of the Louisiana Legislature: "In the case of property subject
to usufruct, except In the case where the property was actually producing
minerals at the date of the creation of the usufruct, the consent of the usu-
fructuary is not necessary. The mineral lease may be validly executed by
the naked owner, who shall, in the absence of an express agreement, be
entitled to receive the down payment, the delay rentals and the royalties,
and the lessee shall have the full right of possession for all the purposes of
the lease without interference by the usufructuary. However, when the
property was actually producing minerals at the date of the creation of the
usufruct, the lease may be validly executed by the usufructuary who shall be
entitled to all of the avails of the lease, and the consent of the naked owner
shall not be necessary. In such case, the naked owner shall take over the
property at the termination of the usufruct, subject to any such valid leases
executed by the usufructuary. Likewise, in such case, whatever shall have
been received by the usufructuary shall be deemed income and therefore not
due to be restored to the owner." See also Article 28: "Likewise, the usufruct
of the mineral right Is considered In law a perfect usufruct, as in the case
of other Immovables." But see Dreyfous, The Relation of the Proposed Min-
eral Code to the Civil Law (1938) Tulane L. Rev. 606.
130. See Kulp, op. cit. supra note 57, at 84, n. 10.
131. 6 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 106, at 566, no. 450.
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ments. It resembles a lease only in that it contains a definite
or indefinite term and provides for surface rights necessary to
development, from which incidental attributes it derives its
nam e.,
182
The reports are full of similar statements made by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana. These rentals arising out of a mineral con-
tract contemplating development, whether or not the latter ever
ensues, certainly should not be confused with ordinary land rent-
als and might best be allotted in the same manner as are the other
revenues.
The attempted analysis of the problems presented in this
paper is grounded upon the belief that the courts of Louisiana
have made it plain that, under the non-ownership theory of oil
and gas, a sale or lease can confer only the right to explore, and
that consequently when problems of basic fundamental concepts
of ownership are involved, solutions must be based upon this one
idea. The main arguments against this theory seem to proceed
from dicta and inadvertent comments made from time to time
in cases whose decisions do not involve the underlying rule. The
decision of the case of Gulf Refining Company v. Glassell'13 and
the statements made therein are given entirely too much weight.
The case was a procedural settlement and has been strictly con-
fined to that holding in subsequent litigation. 3 4 The decision did
not evidence, in the writer's judgment, any intention on the part
of the Supreme Court to negate their firm statements and impor-
tant judgments bearing upon the problems discussed in this paper.
It is a noteworthy juridical achievement that the court has
been able, in formulating a new jurisprudence, to waver little and
to create a body of principles from statutes old and poorly adapted
to the subject matter in hand. The future settlement of the many
unanswered questions raised in this discussion, which mean so
much to the property owners of this state, may be a hopeful
expectation.
132. Glassmire, op. cit. supra note 10, at 68. (Italics supplied).
133. 180 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936); see La. Act 205 of 1938, negating the
effect of this decision.
134. Smith v. Kennon, 188 La. 101, 175 So. 763 (1937); United Gas Public
Service Co. v. Mitchell, 188 La. 651, 177 So. 697 (1937); Tyson v. Spearman,
-La.-, 183 So. 201 (1938). The lessee of an oil and gas lease has an action
against lessor to have validity of lease judicially determined. Jefferson v.
Childers, 189 La. 46, 179 So. 30 (1938).
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